



Monks and businessmen in Catalonia: the Benedictines of Montserrat (1900-1936)1 
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Introduction. 
The history of Spain cannot be understood without the presence of the Catholic 
Church, even though the preponderant role of this institution gradually decayed, more 
slowly during the 19th century and in a more accelerated way during the 20th century. 
Nevertheless, its accumulated decline did not prevent the Catholic Church from 
continuing to be, together with the army, one of the most relevant institutions in the 
country. However, it had to learn to cope with the new game rules fostered by liberal 
revolutions. In the time between the first third of the 19th century and the first third of 
the 20th century, a Catholic basis deeply rooted in the social body of the nation 
coexisted with anti-clerical currents that ranged from those trying to separate the 
Church from the State – hoping to clearly delimit the role and pre-eminence of the civil 
power – to those, deeply anti-religious, which prevailed during the Second Republic and 
the later Civil War.  
With such social division, the history of Spain between 1833 and 1936 was a 
constant pendulum-like motion between pro-clerical and anti-clerical governments. The 
1830s witnessed several ecclesiastical confiscations, the abolition of monasteries, the 
uncloistering of the members of religious orders and the expulsion of the Society of 
Jesus. The Isabeline period (1844-1868) followed, and the different orders and 
congregations were allowed to return to Spain while the Church was able to recover 
from its losses. The 1868 Revolution marked the end of that period, bringing new 
expulsions, abolitions and uncloistering decrees. The Restoration and the Dictatorship 
of General Primo de Rivera (1874-1931) represented the longest period of stability in 
Spain along that century and meant the definitive establishment of religious orders in 




Second Republic again released the anti-clerical forces and opened a new period of 
unrest for the Church. 
During the last third of the 19th century, the Spanish Church had 
accumulated enough negative experiences as to mistrust an ever uncertain future 
in the face of the political swings in Spain and it took advantage of the stability 
provided during the Restoration period to adopt certain defensive strategies. In the 
course of those final years of the century, some religious orders had learnt that they 
had to be efficient in concealing their properties – or at least part of them – from the 
eyes of the political power if they wanted to survive and avoid possible future 
confiscation processes, undertaken by a State they did not trust.2 Historiography shows 
an enormous gap in what concerns regular orders, research having been focused almost 
exclusively on the legal and political aspects of the relationship between the State and 
the Church and between society and the Church, or in deepening the knowledge of 
ecclesiastical hierarchy and secular clergy.3 A relevant number of authors point to the 
existence of a research gap regarding regular orders, of which very little is known 
except for minimal contributions on the Jesuits.4 References on the patrimony of regular 
orders are still barely anything else than general comments. For instance, García de 
Cortázar speaks of “el vertiginoso enriquecimiento de algunas instituciones 
religiosas” (“the extremely rapid enrichment of certain religious institutions”), 
although he offers little specific information on it; Domínguez Ortiz states that the 
reconstruction of the regular orders with thousands of members together with the 
buildings that accommodated them “no pudo hacerse sin una adecuada 
infraestructura material, pero sobre este punto se extiende un espeso manto de 
silencio” (“could not be made without the adequate material infrastructure, but on 




indispensable para sostener estas obras” (“the indispensable backing to support 
those works”).5 On this issue, Cárcel clarifies the magnitude of the regular orders’ 
wealth by opposing the theoretical value of their urban properties with their 
profitability, then subtracting the cost of their maintenance, and he concludes that the 
orders were selflessly devoted to teaching since, if their properties “se hubiesen 
vendido, el dinero, bien invertido, hubiera rentado mucho más, y sin ningún trabajo, 
del que dejaba su dedicación a la docencia” (“had been sold, the money, well-
invested, would have effortlessly rendered much higher profits than those obtained 
through their teaching activities”).6 Callahan specifies that, considering the lack of 
“trustable” information, we are most probably unable to know if the religious orders 
indeed accumulated a great patrimony. We can agree with García de Cortázar on that 
some masculine orders “se convirtieron en expertas en el uso de métodos capitalistas” 
(“became experts in the use of capitalistic methods”), but convincing proofs of that 
behaviour are still missing.7 
With this article we aim to contribute to the occupation of a portion of the little 
explored historiographical field dealing with the history of religious orders. Our 
work explains how the Benedictines of the Monastery of Montserrat adopted the 
appropriate strategies to conceal their patrimony from the State. The tool that they used 
– not new for it had already been employed by the Society of Jesus – was the creation of 
a front organisation under the legal figure of a public limited company. If our example 
was just that of a public limited company that acted only as a fake holder of the 
Community’s properties it would not require our effort, since many similar cases have 
already been discussed.8 However, the behaviour of the Benedictine monks at 
Montserrat is singular enough to be considered apart from the usual pattern and it 




Benedictine public limited company a remarkable case. First, its longevity, since the 
company was created in 1913 and, almost one century afterwards, it is still functioning 
– the only case known in this category in Spain. Second, the public limited company in 
Montserrat was more opaque and therefore more successful than those created by other 
religious orders when trying to cover up their properties and guarantee the well-being of 
the Community. Third, the firm was more than just a mechanism to conceal the 
Community’s assets; it became a modernizing tool in the management of its properties 
and businesses. 
The originality of the case lies in that it studies a firm, a public limited company, 
whose hidden owners are members of a religious order, and, confronted with this 
evidence, we may ask ourselves if the company’s management was different from that 
of other organisations whose owners were laymen. The Benedictine company developed 
a double instrumental function: one, it modestly increased the Community’s patrimony 
and, two, it improved the use of the properties and the management of the services 
offered by the monks to the pilgrims arriving to the Monastery. The singular aspect is 
precisely that the public limited company was transformed from its purely defensive 
origin – to avoid the confiscation of the Community’s estate – into a business 
management tool. The Benedictines converted the company into a mechanism to fulfil 
their interests. If longevity and solvency were at the beginning the primary objectives so 
as to preserve the patrimony, during the period of the Second Republic maximizing the 
profits and increasing liquidity soon became the main focus. Finally, from a Business 
History perspective we analyse how the Benedictine Community at Montserrat, without 
actually being conscious of its actions, chose to externalise the management of its 
services and properties by creating a company. This company was legally independent 




by adapting it to less paternalistic parameters and by implementing conservative 
strategies on it.9 
The article is divided into four sections. In the first one, we briefly review the 
history of the Catholic Church in Spain from the end of the absolutist reign of Ferdinand 
VII (1833), along the tortuous path of the establishment of liberalism in Spain, to the 
outbreak of the Civil War (1936). The second section looks into the origin of the 
Benedictine public limited company, from its precedents, when Abbot Deàs took an 
interest in avoiding future governmental confiscations of the Community’s properties, 
to the actual foundation of the company at the time when Marcet held the position of 
ruling abbot. The third section describes the concealing strategies implemented by the 
Benedictine Community, first on their rural properties and, years afterwards, on both the 
buildings surrounding the Monastery and the management of the services offered to the 
pilgrims in them. This way, the company became more than just an interposed society 
that served to hide Benedictine properties away from the State; it became a tool to 
manage the Community’s businesses. Finally, in the fourth section we analyse the 
business strategies implemented by the company’s Administration Board, which can be 
defined as financial solidity, low level of indebtedness and “organic” growth. We also 
analyse the change brought by the establishment of the Second Republic, which was 
aggravated in 1934, when the Community forced the company’s functioning aiming to 
achieve greater liquidity for the Monastery. 
1. The development of the Spanish Catholic Church during the 19th century (1833-
1936). 
Scientific literature has established a six-phase chronological framing of the 
evolution of religious orders in Spain.10 Regarding the history of the Church, the period 




stretches from 1833 to 1843. On that period, events such as the establishment of 
liberalism (Martínez de la Rosa, 1833-1834), ecclesiastical confiscations (Toreno and 
Mendizábal, 1835-1840) and the Regency (Espartero, 1840-1843) followed each other, 
and at the end of it the Ancient Regime Church had been dismantled.11 Spanish 
liberalism, like the coetaneous Latin American liberalism, saw the Catholic Church as 
the bastion of reactionary forces, responsible for the population’s fanaticism and 
illiteracy. Thus, the Liberals planned the battle against the Church having in mind three 
main issues: the clergy’s legal privileges, which they aimed to abolish, the appointment 
of bishops and the wealth of the Church. Regarding this last issue, the Liberals 
understood that the State had to take over the Church’s tithes, real estate and invested 
capitals in order to remove the obstacles that hindered economic progress. The liberal 
State not only contemplates the appropriation of diocesan assets but especially of those 
assets belonging to regular orders, which were denounced as useless, unproductive and 
dangerous due to their popular acceptance.12 
In the specific case of Spain, the confiscation of the real estate of the Church 
was undertaken during the governments of Toreno and Mendizábal.13 Gradually, laws 
were passed that led to the expulsion of the Society of Jesus and to the confiscation of 
its properties (1835), the abolition of convents and monasteries with less than 12 
members (1835), the sale of the assets seized from the abolished religious communities 
(1836) and the uncloistering of their members (1836), in a process that suppressed “los 
monasterios, conventos, colegios, congregaciones y demás casas de comunidad o de 
instituciones religiosas de varones, incluso las de clérigos regulares y las de las 
cuatro órdenes militares” (“monasteries, convents, schools, congregations and other 
community houses belonging to masculine religious institutions, including those of 




The years between 1843 and 1874, the second phase in our scheme, include one 
of the usual comings and goings in Spanish history: one pro-clerical period, under the 
reign of Isabella II (1843-1868), was followed by another deeply anti-clerical reaction 
during the Democratic Six Years Period (1868-1874). During the reign of Isabella II, 
religious orders gradually returned to Spain under the protection of the 1845 
Constitution, which declared, in its article 11, the Catholic religion to be that of the 
Spanish nation and made the State assume the monetary commitment to support the 
secular clergy and maintain the worship. At the beginning of this reign, the sale of 
ecclesiastical properties was suspended, the assets that had not been transferred were 
given back to the secular (not the regular) clergy, exiled bishops returned to Spain, the 
Tribunal of the Roman Rota was re-established and the process of uncloistering 
reversed. A few years later, the 1851 Concordat legally restored the orders, the 
Church’s control of education and its right to own assets.15 During the “Moderate 
Decade” (1844-1854), the episcopacy and the clergy were focused in the vast works of 
reconstruction and administrative and catechist reorganisation.16 Generally speaking, 
the Isabeline reign was a pro-clerical period to the point that the Spanish Church 
became the last defensive bastion of the Isabeline monarchy, thus adopting a political 
role that distinguished the Spanish institution from the French-Belgian and Central 
European Churches, devoted to cultural and social-economic issues.17  
The second part of this phase started with the 1868 Revolution and the 
provisional government of 1869-1870, and it continued with the short reign of Amadeo 
I of Savoy (November 1870 to February 1873) and the later proclamation of the 
ephemeral First Republic (February 1873 to January 1874), which meant the rise to 
power of the most progressive social groups, both democratic and republican, all of 




government were those typical of Spanish anti-clericalism: abolition of the Society of 
Jesus, prohibition of community meetings, freedom of teaching, freedom of worship, 
inhibition of the religious orders from acquiring or possessing assets, extinction of all 
the communities founded after 1837, etc.19 However, the government’s inoperative 
performance in the process of implementing those measures sets the difference between 
the decisions of the Spanish Revolutionary Six Years Period and the actions undertaken 
by the political leaders of the French Third Republic.20 
The third phase, which coincides with the Restoration (1874-1923) and the 
Dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), was the most homogeneous one. 
During the Restoration, of which the Dictatorship represented only the epilogue, the 
“peaceful turn” political system, agreed upon by the Conservative and Liberal Parties, 
was established.21 Under this regime, the confessional character of the State was re-
enacted when the 1876 Constitution recognised that “la religión católica, apostólica y 
romana es la del Estado” (“the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion was that of 
the State”). The traditional alliance between “the Throne and the Altar” was, however, 
not reproduced. The Restoration regime worked to consolidate a point of balance that 
could satisfy the Church while preventing the growing apart of the political and social 
groups that had supported the 1868 Revolution.22  
For the fourth time that century, the Church made a new effort to reorganise its 
hierarchy and its clergy, and on this occasion, the return to Spain of all the regular 
orders was, at last, possible. The expansion of the regular clergy did indeed reach its 
peak during this period. However, the long Restoration years were not without unrest, 
and the anti-clerical wave of the first decade of the 20th century also affected Spain. The 
Jesuits were expelled from Portugal; in Mexico, together with the revolution that 




transformed into an anti-religious movement that provoked the “Cristera” Civil War; in 
France, the Waldeck-Rousseau Law (1902) forced religious associations to be listed in 
the civil registry and to submit to the intervention of the State; furthermore, it expelled a 
high number of members of religious orders from the country.23 In Spain, anti-
clericalism grew at the same pace as the Restoration system looked for the support of 
the Church in order to survive. Spanish anti-clericalism was manifested in the attempts 
of the Liberal Party to intensify the State’s supervision of religious schools, to 
renegotiate the 1851 Concordat, to secularise marriages and cemeteries and, above all, 
to adopt measures so as to control the expansion of the religious orders. Their number 
of members had greatly increased in the last decade due, among other reasons, to the 
arrival of European brothers (Portuguese and French), and thus a “proletariat of 
cassocks” was created that needed to be somehow limited.24  
The climax of the anti-clerical movement was reached in 1909-1910 under the 
effects of two especially resonant events: the Padlock Law and the Tragic Week.25 The 
Padlock Law (December 23rd, 1910) meant to put a limit to the expansion of the 
religious orders in Spain, the population of which had risen from 15,000 members 
around 1860 to 60,000 in the first years of the 20th century.26 The Law intended to 
impede the establishment of new religious orders in Spain without governmental 
permission, a permission which would be automatically denied in case one third or 
more of the order’s population was composed of foreign members.27 However, the fear-
inspiring law was only a compromise solution negotiated by the Conservative and the 
Liberal Parties. On the one hand, it insisted on closing the door to new orders wishing to 
settle in Spain because almost all the existing orders were already active in the country. 
On the other hand, due to a late added clause which stated that the Padlock Law would 




Law actually amounted to nothing.28 The second event was the Tragic Week in 
Barcelona, a popular revolt that started as a protest against the colonial war in Africa 
and derived, among other manifestations, into a violent anti-clerical wave that caused, 
in its excesses, the burning of churches, convents and schools.29  
The Second Republic and the Civil War (1931-1939) represent the fourth 
phase.30 Two were the central issues that provoked the confrontation between 
Republican politicians and the Catholic Church: the Constitution and education. The 
Republican Constitution, in its article 26, stated that religious orders could neither 
accumulate properties nor develop industrial, commercial or educational activities, 
being subjected to the general tax legislation.31 Those orders that, in addition to the 
three canonical vows, imposed a special fourth vow of obedience to an authority other 
than the legitimate one of the Spanish State were abolished; this was the reason for the 
abolition and expulsion of the Jesuits. Regarding education, the discussion focused on 
multi-grade schools and on the possibility for religious orders to keep their schools 
open.32 In the end, religious orders were denied that right, but their members were 
allowed to teach in the surviving Catholic schools. 
Regarding the use of the Church’s properties, the Second Republic was 
confronted with a disoriented Catholic hierarchy: each prelate reacted separately due to 
the lack of consensus on what to do with the assets.33 The relationship between the 
government and the Church was affected by the government’s confiscation of a series of 
documents related to Cardinal Segura (the Cardinal Primate of Spain) in which parish 
priests were invited to sell the assets and valuable objects of their parishes. This caused 
the indignation of anti-clerical groups and precipitated the decision of the government 
to forbid those sales.34 The interception of some documents signed by the Bishop of 




selling of ecclesiastical properties to third persons who were not related to the Church 
and, to any possible extent, to locate all properties in foreign countries.35 The content of 
these documents confirmed and accelerated the government’s procedures leading to the 
publication of the August 20th 1931 Decree which suspended the faculty of selling, 
transferring and levying taxes on personal properties, real estate or real rights of the 
Church, religious orders, institutes and houses.36 
2. Gestation and foundation of La Agrícola Regional, Sociedad Anónima (Larsa). 
2.1. Mistrust against Spanish liberal governments: Fear and uncertainty. 
Generally speaking, monastic orders represented the most conservative 
sector within the Church. They had accumulated hostility against liberal 
politicians.37 On the other hand, the isolation in which the monks lived made them 
prone to feel harassed by external forces that they could neither understand nor 
control. Isolation was inherent to monastic communities: they ran their own 
novitiate and seminaries and the monks spent all their lives in an ecclesiastical society 
totally closed to external influences.38  
In order to understand why, in 1913, the Benedictine Community of Montserrat 
decided to constitute a public limited company to which it transferred its properties, we 
must get acknowledged with the feeling of enclosure and hounding on the part of the 
Spanish liberal state experienced by the Benedictines ever since the refoundation of the 
Monastery in 1844.39 In Montserrat, the monks’ isolation increased after the 
election in 1885 of Abbot Deàs, a former diocesan parish priest and a practical 
man obsessed with the lonely and penitential character of the Sanctuary and with a 
very conservative point of view regarding the essence of monastic life – and of civil 
life as well. He had been a good, calculating, and respected treasurer before, a 




Community40. From Deàs actions we can infer that he and the whole Benedictine 
Community must have lived tormented by an uncertain ‘liberal’ threat that had 
previously materialised several times. With the purpose of eluding it, in 1883 Deàs 
asked for a first permission from the Holy Siege to sell the Community’s jewels 
and thus “evitar que los revolucionarios o los gobiernos liberales se apoderen de 
ellas” (“prevent revolutionary men or the liberal government from stealing 
them”)41. The defensive strategy designed by Deàs was double-fold: to assure the 
generational replacement of the Monastery with the entry of new monks, and to 
safeguard its patrimony. The abbot consolidated the Benedictine foundations in the 
Philippines and Australia to benefit from the fact that the Spanish juridical order 
allowed religious congregations to keep the novitiates open as long as the newly 
ordained monks were posted in communities outside Spain – a legal front to continue 
enlarging the Order.42 In 1890 the feeling of enclosure was so evident that Abbot Deàs 
obtained permission from the Community and from the Holy Siege to conceal the 
Community’s money and jewels in a safe place only known by him and the treasurer.43 
In addition, the Community transferred some of its rural estates to certain monks under 
a lay and private title (sic). The Council Book (1891) points out that Deàs was ordered 
to appoint his heirs so as to guarantee the transmission of the properties holding his 
name, and it also refers that the vineyards recently acquired (1892) in El Bruch were 
registered as belonging to Brother Pelegrín Bosch.44  
Spain’s growing anti-clerical atmosphere in the first decade of the 20th century 
did indeed affect the Community. Those were years on which anti-clerical policies were 
approved by the Liberal Party and on which the 1851 Concordat was being 
renegotiated, while news coming from other European countries were everything but 




Waldeck-Rousseau Law (1902), by which several religious orders were expelled from 
the country and all religious associations were forced to register as such in the civil 
registry and to submit to the State’s intervention.45  
These events added to the anguish and fear of Abbot Deàs and the Community at 
Montserrat. Deàs perceived new threats in the government’s attitude towards the regular 
orders that could be translated into confiscations and even into forced uncloistering. 
New uncertainties accelerated a defensive strategy that went further than the one 
previously implemented. The Community approved Deàs’ proposal to sell and 
“monetise” (sic) all the Community’s rural estates and, later on, requested from Rome 
the corresponding permission to transfer those estates, alluding to the imminent danger 
of their being confiscated.46 The Holy Siege quickly responded (December 1906) 
allowing the sale, given the “crítica situación actual de las corporaciones religiosas en 
España” (“present critical situation of the religious congregations in Spain”).47 
Once the permission was granted, those estates that were still owned by the Monastery 
were registered as personal properties of relevant Benedictine monks: the estate of 
“Manso Estruch” (138 hectares, in the villages of Esparraguera and Collbató) was 
registered under the name of Antonio Marcet i Poal (the future ruling and, later on, 
titular abbot), while the estate of “Castell del Mas” (13 hectares) and two other 
neighbouring land plots that amounted to 17 hectares (all of them in the village of 
Esparraguera) were registered under the name of the abbot, Josep Deàs.48 
However, the peak of the anti-clerical movement in Spain was reached during 
the Tragic Week in nearby Barcelona, and with the passing of the Padlock Law.49 The 
reaction of Abbot Deàs was almost immediate. In 1911 Deàs asked Luis Vives, an 
attorney he trusted, to undertake a juridical study of the Mountain of Montserrat, 




ownership of the Community’s entire patrimony. Deàs still worried about the estates 
since they could be affected by future anti-clerical decrees promulgated by the 
government in office. The attorney’s final report was devastating.50 The Mountain of 
Montserrat was totally owned by the Episcopal Diocese of Barcelona and the buildings 
built on it were precariously owned by the Community. If the Diocese demanded it, the 
Community could be disowned since “según las reglas jurídicas actualmente en vigor 
(…) todo lo edificado en suelo ajeno cede a favor del propietario de éste” (“according 
to the legal rules presently valid (…) all buildings raised on foreign ground belong 
to the ground’s proprietor”). In addition, Vives called the abbot’s attention to the fact 
that the expensive system used to maintain the properties under the name of private 
people –when these people died, 20 percent of the property’s value had to be used to 
face the payment of real rights– did not eliminate the lack of security in the face of the 
government’s future behaviour. It was worth establishing a new, safer and less 
expensive mechanism. The attorney’s suggestion was clear: the best solution was to 
create a public limited company, all the better if outside Spain, in a country like 
England or Germany. The capital of this public limited company would be divided into 
bearer-shares, so that “straw men” – actually Benedictine monks in the chosen country 
who would keep their identities secret – managed the company according to the 
country’s laws. Bearer-shares would allow the Community to retain possession of its 
properties. However, if need be of having another person own the shares, these would 
only need to be transferred, since the Commercial Code acknowledged the holder’s title 
of a bearer-share only while the opposite could not be proved. The public limited 
company thus constituted would acquire the Community’s properties and would then 
exploit them on its own, having as well the possibility of renting them to the 




buildings on the Mountain of Montserrat, Vives recommended that the public limited 
company bought them. 
2.2. The foundation of La Agrícola Regional, S.A. (Larsa). 
In 1912, due to Deàs’ old age, Antonio M. Marcet i Poal was elected ruling 
abbot of Montserrat and assumed all the executive tasks of his position, although the 
ecclesiastical dignity associated to it still remained in the hands of Abbot Deàs.51 With 
Marcet in command, the Community of Montserrat progressed along the way designed 
by Deàs. Just a few months after his designation, Marcet followed the master plan 
designed by Vives and created a public limited company with bearer-shares. 
The report of attorney Vives, favourable to the creation of this public limited 
company to conceal the Benedictines’ properties, reflects the ideas of the Catalonian 
business current that promoted the legal transformation of companies. In the 1910s, a 
process started in Catalonia that led many companies to abandon their traditional legal 
figures (collective regular companies and partnerships) and adopt that of the public 
limited company.52 The choice of the public limited company rendered the Benedictines 
similar advantages to those experienced by the companies in their economic 
environment. This figure was probably not an unknown and strange tool for an abbot 
like Marcet, who belonged to a family of industrialists.53 In addition to being a principle 
of this business current, the public limited company appeared before the monks as an 
instrument powerful enough to conceal their patrimony and to cause sufficient juridical 
trouble to the State in case it intended to undertake confiscation. In this line, the Jesuits 
had been using public limited companies ever since the end of the 19th century. The 
historical Jesuit regions of Castile and Aragon opted for this strategy during the anti-
clerical period of 1906-1914, but the Jesuits’ first public limited company was actually 




of having introduced this innovatory strategy, we can nevertheless point to the dreadful 
choice of the companies’ names (La Educación, S.A., La Instrucción, S.A., La 
Instrucción Católica, S.A., La Enseñanza Católica, S.A.) that evidenced their origin and 
owners, and to their inoperative management.54 
In the autumn of 1913 both incentives converged in the constitution of Larsa, the 
Benedictine public limited company. Nevertheless, its creation was not the result of a 
current of ecclesiastical modernisation towards less archaic ways of acting, behaving 
and thinking. Neither was it indirectly provoked by the pressure of the State on the 
Church – an institution accused of being archaic and retrograde in what concerns 
economic growth and social progress. We feel more inclined to argue that public limited 
companies belonging to regular orders – and the Benedictine company was no 
exception – were the consequence of the orders’ fear of losing the patrimony they had 
been able to rebuild with such great efforts during the last decades. In the case of 
Montserrat, the difference is that the public limited company evolved to become an 
efficient tool for the management of the order’s properties, something that the Jesuits 
did not achieve with their companies, which could not even fulfil the objective of 
avoiding confiscation.55 
La Agrícola Regional S.A. (Larsa) was founded on October 31st 1913 and its 
social capital amounted to 300,000 pesetas (see Table 1) represented by 300 bearer-
shares. Its purpose was the purchase and sale of rural and urban estates, the exploitation 
of agrarian products and other legitimate businesses the associates might agree upon.56 
The founding share-holders were carefully selected by the ruling abbot Marcet, as it is 
reflected on a letter dated July 1913 and written by notary Joaquín Dalmau to Marcet, 
willing to find out whether “ya tiene localizadas a las personas que [la] funden como 




persons selected were: president Francisco Cabot i Rovira (75 shares, a trustworthy 
man, as proved in previous assignments), vice-president Juan Marcet i Palet (80 shares, 
the ruling abbot’s cousin), secretary Francisco Mundó i Fló (30 shares, the ruling 
abbot’s brother-in-law), and members Juan Colomé i Trayté (50 shares, a trustworthy 
attorney who had faithfully served Abbot Deàs in 1906-1907), Josep Marcet i Poal (35 
shares, the ruling abbot’s brother) and Francisco Suñol i Baulenas (30 shares, brother to 
a Benedictine monk).58 
With the front company thus constituted, the following step was to transfer the 
rural properties to the company through the juridical artifice of a simulated sale.59 The 
account of the purchase and sale procedure, reproduced in the Minute Book of La 
Agrícola Regional, is written as a novelistic plot to hold the simulation, hoping to avoid 
a governmental intervention that could prove the feigning and confiscate the public 
limited company. The records explain how Juan Colomé read in the papers that abbots 
Deàs and Marcet were to visit Barcelona, and how he informed the president of the 
company; how the president met the abbots in order to confirm the rumour that said 
they meant to sell the Community’s estates and how he presented a first offer for those 
lands. During the meeting, the abbots corroborated Francisco Cabot, the commercial 
agent presently managing their economic activities, on their wish to sell the estates. The 
negotiation to establish the final price of the estates is also recounted in detail. A 
paragraph of a letter from Deàs to Larsa expresses the monks’ interest in taking 
precautions against possible future menaces: 
“[los abades] pues prevén el día en que la propiedad de los religiosos en España, sea en 
su nombre individual o colectivo será seriamente amenazada y tanto es así que sabe 
que el Rmo. P. Coadjutor desde que tomó posesión de su cargo en enero último no ha 
dejado este negocio un solo punto y poco antes de salir de Montserrat el pasado 
domingo, se recibió en dicho Monasterio una carta dirigida al P. Simó, Subprior, 
fechada en Roma en 7 u 8 del corriente en que entre otras cosas le manifestaba el 
Rvdo. P. Marcet que sería conveniente que apenas vuelto de su viaje pudiera, él y todos 





(“[the abbots] thus foresee the day on which the property of religious orders in 
Spain, be it under individual or collective name, will be seriously threatened and it is 
so that the Reverend Ruling Father has not mistreated the issue ever since he was 
appointed in January, and right before leaving Montserrat last Sunday a letter was 
received in this Monastery addressed to Father Simó, Subprior, dated in Rome on 
April 7th or 8th, on which, among other things, Reverend Father Marcet manifested 
that just after his return it would be appropriate that he and the rest of the monks 
proprietors sold their estates and possessions.”) 
 
After these comings and goings, on December 1913, Larsa’s Share-holders 
General Assembly made a firm offer of 127,100 pesetas for all the estates, 185 hectares 
altogether.61 The breakdown of the estates transferred was the following: 
1. “Manso Estruch”: 62,300 pesetas (32,500 pesetas for the land in Esparraguera 
and 29,800 for the land in Collbató). 
2. Estate in the Mountain of Montserrat: 2,800 pesetas. 
3. “Manso Castell”: 45,500 pesetas. 
4. Neighbouring rural estate: 4,500 pesetas. 
5. Neighbouring rural estate: 11,000 pesetas. 
6. Neighbouring rural estate: 500 pesetas. 
7. Vineyard in El Bruch: 500 pesetas. 
The land purchase and sale was closed in February 1914 and in May the estates 
were rented to the Benedictine Community, thus concluding the plan designed by the 
attorney Vives three years earlier.62 The renting conditions were favourable to the 
Benedictines: 
“1ª. No arrendarlas a la Rda. Comunidad de Montserrat por mayor tiempo de cinco 
 años, si bien dicho arrendamiento puede ser confirmado una ó más veces por cinco 
 años más previo mutuo consentimiento de ambas partes. 
2ª. La cantidad mínima mensual queda fijada en 420 ptas., pagaderas por trimestres
 anticipados. 
3ª las contribuciones directas y defensa agrícola etc. Y otras indirectas sobre las mimas 
 fincas, irán a cargo y nombre de la sociedad. 
4ª las contribuciones industriales que tal vez afecten a industrias que se ejerzan en las 
 mismas, a cargo de los arrendatarios. 
5º. Los gastos para abonos químicos, máquina agrícolas, análisis de tierras, trabajos 
 experimentación y repoblación de cultivos con especies nuevas, de instrumentos y 
 aperos nuevos, irán a cargo de la sociedad. 
6º. Los gastos para reparación de máquinas, renovación de aperos e instrumentos, irán 
 a cargo de los arrendatarios quienes cada año presentarán un inventario de los 
 instrumentos nuevamente adquiridos y de los que hayan resultado inútiles para el 
 servicio. 
7º. Los consumos y otros impuestos municipales serán objeto de mutua discusión al 





“First. The estates will not be rented to the Reverend Community of Montserrat for a 
 period longer than 5 years, although this renting can be confirmed one or more times 
 for five more years if the two parts mutually consent. 
Second. The minimal monthly amount is fixed in 420 pesetas, to be paid in advance 
 every three months.  
Third. Direct contributions, such as the agrarian defence, and indirect contributions to 
 the estates will be the company’s responsibility as title-holder. 
Fourth. Industrial contributions that may affect the industries developed in those 
 estates will be the tenants’ responsibility. 
Fifth. The expenses on chemical fertilisers, agrarian machines, soil analyses, and 
 experimentation and repopulation tasks developed with new species and tools in the 
 estates will be assumed by the company. 
Sixth. The expenses in repairing machinery and renewing tools will be assumed by the 
 tenants who will annually present a list of the tools newly acquired and of those that 
 have turned useless for their service. 
Seventh. Consumptions and other municipal taxes will be discussed when the renting is 
 established.” 
 
Larsa received 10,000 pesetas per year from renting the estates. The company’s 
managers immediately started an improvement program which included the introduction 
of electric power in the estates, the intensification in the use of fertilisers, the renewal of 
the machinery and the increment of the patrimony. All the lands purchased by Larsa 
from the beginning of the 1930s were rented to the Community. In this land purchase 
process, we can underline the acquisition in 1920 of a 45 hectares estate in the 
Mountain – still registered under Deàs’ name – for 1,000 pesetas, and the purchase of a 
small land plot in Collbató (1 hectare) for 500 pesetas, allowing for the rounding up of 
the property of “Manso Estruch”. In 1924, “Can Martorell” (27 hectares) was bought 
with a 25,000 pesetas loan – redeemable in five years – granted to Larsa by the 
Benedictine Community. In 1931, Larsa bought a small estate, neighbour to “Can 
Estruch”, for 600 pesetas. Trying to improve the patrimonial situation of the estates, 
Larsa also developed a policy that led to the purchase of the rabassas, ground rents and 
emphyteusis that taxed these lands with 128,025 pesetas (January 1919).64  
3. Larsa’s transformation: From an agrarian company to a services company.  
 In April 1931, the Second Republic was proclaimed in Spain and, together with 
the change of regime, the religious communities’ forecast for the future became more 




Father in Leon had stated, already six months before the establishment of the Republic, 
that the assets had to be concealed and the properties simulated. And the head of the 
religious house in Madrid was, already at the end of 1930, looking for possible ways for 
his Jesuits to flee. Right after the proclamation of the new regime on April 14th, a 
meeting of the Jesuit provincial fathers was held (April 27th) meant to decide on how to 
secure the buildings and act in relation to the public limited companies that had until 
then camouflaged their schools. They decided to ask Rome for permission to sell, 
mortgage or pignorate their properties (the permission was granted on April 30th) and to 
improve the model of public limited companies, because the existing ones were poorly 
constituted and managed, and it would be very easy to find out who were their actual 
owners – the companies’ names clearly indicated that they belonged to a religious 
institution.65 
Although they had already transferred their estates, the Benedictines were again 
fearful at the thought of what could happen with the Mountain of Montserrat, where the 
Sanctuary, the Monastery and the annexes that housed their businesses were located – 
and with the businesses themselves. The Community was aware that the Mountain 
belonged to the Episcopal Diocese of Barcelona and that the buildings were in a 
situation of juridical indeterminacy. The Community could not register their names in 
the property registry since they were built on the land of the Bishop of Barcelona, who 
would be granted the property of the buildings the moment he claimed it. But if the 
Mountain were confiscated from the Bishop of Barcelona, the new owner of the land 
would immediately become the legal proprietor of the buildings, with the right to 
recover them any time. The industrial and commercial activities that the 




belonged to the Community although the buildings that housed them were in a 
situation of legal indeterminacy.  
Abbot Marcet proved to be swift and clever on his decision concerning the 
annexes of the Monastery and the businesses there developed. On May 1st 1931, a few 
days after the proclamation of the Republic and spurred by the burning of churches and 
convents in Madrid, Malaga and Seville, the Benedictines made a double decision. First, 
to buy land in Andorra under the premise of having a place where “refugiar-se la 
Comunitat en cas de venir l’espulsió de les ordes religioses” (“the Community could 
seek refuge if the religious orders were finally expelled”) and, second, to transfer all 
the assets and services owned by the Community to La Agrícola Regional in order to 
build funds for the new land purchases. They transferred the grocery store, the liquor 
factory, the rooms, the hotel and restaurant, the garage and the restaurants in the 
Mountain, together with the religious house in Barcelona. The name of the holders of 
the Community’s current accounts were also changed so that now, instead of the 
juridical figure of the Monastery, the abbot and the treasurer held them individually 
under lay and private titles.66  
At the beginning of July 1931 the Benedictines initiated the actions to make 
effective the renting of their services to Larsa. The operation meant that the company 
had to grow in order to finance the expansion, and it could do it either through 
indebtedness or by asking its share-holders to confront a share offer. Larsa was 
managed under the parameters of guaranteeing its longevity and keeping its control in 
the hands of the monks, and in order to achieve those objectives the best possibility was 
to increase its own resources through a 350,000 pesetas capital increase, which raised 
the company’s capital to 500,000 pesetas (Table 1). The share-holders assumed this 




was thus quickly effected and signed on July 30th 1931. Just in time, because the 
Republican government soon passed a decree that suspended the faculty of the Church, 
religious orders, institutes and houses to sell, transfer and levy taxes on personal estate, 
real estate or real rights (August 20th 1931). Later on, the Republican Constitution 
established that religious orders could neither accumulate assets nor develop industrial, 
commercial or educational activities, being subjected to the general tax legislation.68 
Larsa’s Shareholders Extraordinary General Assembly approved to rent the 
establishments directly run by the Community and those the Community had 
previously rented to third parties. The purchase of the furniture and goods used in those 
establishments was also decided upon. The contract was signed on August 18th and it 
settled the rent on 200,000 pesetas per year to be paid by Larsa to the Community for 
renting the businesses pertaining to the monks. The breakdown was as follows:  
Hospices (San José, San Alfonso, Venerable and Nuestra 
Señora)…………………………………………………………... 25,000 pesetas. 
Hotel and Restaurant at the Monastery………………………….. 75,000 pesetas. 
Garage………………………………………………………….... 15,000 pesetas. 
Grocery store…………………………………………………….. 65,000 pesetas.   
Barber shop…………………………………………………………... 50 pesetas. 
Public toilets………………………………………………………. 1,900 pesetas.    
Kiosks at the fountain square………….………………………….. 3,000 pesetas. 
Restaurant Santa Cecilia.…………………………………………. 4,025 pesetas.     
Restaurant San Juan………………………………………………. 4,025 pesetas.   
Restaurant San Jerónimo…….……………………………………. 7,000 pesetas. 
The purchase of materials and goods effected by Larsa included the furniture of 
the different stores (counters, shelves, showcases, etc.), decorative elements (lamps, 




cradles, towels, linen, pillows, etc.) and restaurants (including kitchenware and 
electrical appliances), cold and hot water installations, the furniture of the hotels and 
restaurants (tables, wardrobes, counters, armchairs, sofas, chairs, carpets, etc.) and 
“cuantos muebles ropas, utensilios, máquinas, enseres, accesorios, útiles y demás 
bienes muebles” (“all furniture, clothes, tools, machinery, accessories, belongings 
and personal estate”) – all of it for 76,250 pesetas.69 In other words, the monks 
monetised all the personal estate from the different businesses since having liquidity 
available was enormously advantageous in case they were finally expelled from the 
country. 
Within four months, Abbot Marcet had implemented new strategic lines. He had 
created a new front company named Cultural Andorrana, formed by Father Pemtebre, 
native of Andorra, and other Fathers and laymen. This company was responsible for 
purchasing new land in Andorra. The services developed in the annex buildings of the 
Monastery had been rented and all the personal estate had been sold to La Agrícola 
Regional.70  
Parallel to this, Larsa changed the way on which the different businesses were 
organised. In taking control of its new activities, Larsa discovered that the system used 
by the Benedictines was paternalistic, based in the trust generated by the tenants’ 
dependence on the monks, and excessively tolerant. The Administration Board 
concluded that the inherited model could not be maintained if a better management 
was to be established with the aim of generating more profit. Larsa started a process 
that aimed to create “un nuevo régimen de organización y control de todos los 
servicios en general” (“a new system to organise and manage all the services”), and 
very soon “a regime of control” was implemented that did not exist before. The 




activities by personnel hired ex professo by the company to accomplish each task. 
However, the monks stayed some time in their positions so as to transmit their know-
how to the new personnel. To lead this process, the Administration Board decided to 
hire an “administrador o gerente” (administrator or manager).71 
4. Larsa’s  business strategies.  
Before analysing the strategy implemented by Larsa’s managers it is important 
that we define the company’s characteristics and objectives. Both characteristics and 
objectives determine the strategy applied on any given moment. Larsa’s characteristics 
included its being a small-size company (Table 1), its “organic” development (through 
the reinvestment of profit), and its infrequent resort to the financial and capital markets 
(it was circumscribed to short-term commercial financing).72 Larsa’s objectives 
contemplated the assurance of the company’s longevity as the only mechanism able to 
guarantee the maintenance of the Order’s patrimony and therefore the survival of the 
Monastery and the Community.73 The second objective was to keep the control of the 
company in the hands of the Community through several “straw men”. Trustable 
persons, external to the Community, had to be appointed to occupy the different 
positions at the Administration Board, since the monks could not be members of it: 
technically speaking, they were not share-holders, and, in addition, they absolutely 
needed to preserve Larsa’s screen-like character, which would have been revealed 
through their presence in this company’s body.74  
Two were as well the strategies implemented by Larsa. The first one, developed 
between 1914 and 1934, can be called conservative in the first and strictest sense of the 
word: to help preserve the business and to secure the Community’s control over it. In 
this line, Larsa preferred to enjoy greater solidity by avoiding delicate financial 




basis – and growth – smaller size, better control. In those years, Larsa behaved in a 
similar way to other companies in Catalonia75. For instance, cotton textile 
companies, most of them family-owned and run, had similar objectives, 
characteristics and strategies, and they were all financially solid, their own 
resources representing more than 60 percent of their capital76. 
Larsa’s new strategy after 1934 involved a change of objectives, which now 
were focused in endowing the Community with the greatest liquidity available, even if 
it meant sacrificing the financial stability of the company.77 After that date, Larsa’s 
behaviour differed from that of other companies in its environment, which were not 
affected by the political instability of the Republic and were able to maintain their 
financial structure without effecting alterations meant to increase liquidity. The 
question, left unanswered in the introduction, regarding the possible differences 
between the companies directed by members of religious orders and those managed by 
laymen is now responded. Larsa, which was Benedictine-owned, decided to transform 
its conservative strategy into a new one designed to generate liquidity and it did it with 
the change of political regime and, especially, after the October 1934 Revolution, 
spurred by the monks’ fear of losing their properties and of being expelled from Spain.78  
The available accounting data allow us to approach the economic-financial 
activity of Larsa, which was based on two different mechanisms: self-financing and the 
allocation of reserves. These mechanisms allowed the Benedictine firm to achieve great 
solidity, since we cannot even speak of indebtedness ratios in the case of Larsa: it had 
almost no accounts payable, and no long-term debts at all (Table 2). The company grew 
upon its own resources. Its own capital was hegemonic ever since the foundation, so 
that Larsa was over-capitalised from the beginning and it was forced to start a reduction 




not been invested and were thus unproductive. In 1931, the company had to face an 
important capital expansion when it rented the Community’s buildings and services and 
bought the personal estate in them.79 Regarding the expansion of 1934, the scarce 
information available on it indicates that it was undertaken in order to meet the 
exploitation of the Cable Car to Montserrat80. During the period analysed, there were 
only two exceptions on which the company resorted to external financing: the first one, 
when it increased its rural patrimony with the purchase of “Can Martorell” through an 
interest-free loan, redeemable in five years, granted by the Benedictine Community. On 
the second occasion, in 1929, the Community lent Larsa 20,000 pesetas to finance 
different improvement works undertaken in the estates (supra), to cover the high 
expenses on fertilisers and to support the introduction of bovine cattle and pigs in its 
lands. In both occasions, Larsa behaved exactly like the companies in its geographical 
surroundings, which became indebted with the members of the family that owned the 
firm to avoid resorting to external lenders. This type of action was very frequent, for 
example, among Catalonian cotton-producing families that granted loans in favour of 
their companies.81 The other basic column sustaining the financial solidity of the 
company was the allocation of reserves that grew together with the benefits and were 
supported by the lack of dividend distribution.82 The decision of creating a 
contingency fund account to hold each year’s profit and retained earnings was 
adopted by the General Shareholders Meeting in February 1919, being 
implemented in 1920. The amount initially deposited in that account was 5,372 
pesetas. The General Shareholders Meeting of 1926 insisted on increasing the 
contingency fund to 15,000 pesetas by means of not distributing the dividends, and 
on the 1929 Meeting the President declared that it was impossible to distribute the 




and safeguard reserves.83 The accumulation of the contingency fund was only 
temporarily interrupted in 1930 when the reserves were used to redeem the 20,000 
pesetas loan of the previous year. It happened again in 1934-1935 when, under the 
pressure of the special institutional frame of this period and following the advice of the 
Administration Board, two dividend distributions were implemented.  
In the previous paragraphs we described the geographical-entrepreneurial 
setting in which Larsa can be framed, but this setting does not allow us to compare 
the evolution and profit level of the different companies. Catalonian and Spanish 
companies experienced a phase of singular prosperity during the years of the First 
World War and the immediate post-war period. In those years earnings were 
extraordinary and the companies’ high profitability hinders any possible 
comparison with Larsa.84 
In the evolution of Larsa’s profits two periods can be distinguished: before 
and after the proclamation of the Second Republic. Before 1931, the company was 
just the owner of some rural estates, and business objectives were not focused on 
maximizing profits but on increasing, maintaining and improving the properties. 
Profitability, in relation to the company’s own resources, was minimal until 1924. From 
that year onwards, and after investments were made in order to increase and improve 
the patrimony, profitability grew during a six-year period reaching 4 percent in 1930 
(Graph 1).85 This behaviour was feasible if we consider that Larsa had been created 
neither to generate high profitability nor to be a reference company in managing rural 
patrimonies. Its objective had always been to safeguard the Community’s properties 
from undetermined future governmental confiscations. With the establishment of the 
Republic, the business model and its administration were modified. Larsa became a 




functioning and increased its economic activity and profits, thus allowing for an 
increment of the reserves from 20,000 pesetas in 1930 to 117,000 pesetas in 1933. 
The information drawn from the documents corresponding to the years 
immediately before the Civil War (1934-1936) is fragmentary and only allows 
establishing working hypothesis. After the 1934 October Revolution and due to the 
growing uncertainty regarding the political future of the Second Republic, the 
Administration Board changed the business strategy, which now concentrated in 
assuring financial liquidity. The hypothesis is based on the fact that the profits in 
1934 and 1935 were mainly the result of a decrease in the surplus accumulated in 
previous years, not the outcome of business dynamics. In fact, reserves dropped from 
117,000 pesetas in 1933 to 37,000 pesetas in 1935 (Table 1). Second, the disposable 
capital of the company rose from 5,500 pesetas in 1933 to 100,000 in 1935. Finally, 
Larsa twice effected a dividend distribution (71,500 pesetas) so that the liquidity 
generated was partly transferred to the real owners, the monks. 
 The hypothesis that sustains this behaviour points to the monks’ fear of 
being uncloistered or even expelled from Spain. Larsa’s liquidity served them to have 
money available to face an undetermined future. The dividends perceived would help 
the Community to purchase land in Andorra in case they were finally expelled from the 
country, and to increase the Community’s investment in safe assets, many of which 
were located in foreign countries, easily transported and negotiated if need be. 
This hypothesis leads us to one last issue that must be analysed: the 
Community’s investment policy. The Benedictines had for a long time invested their 
incomes in liquid assets that could be conveyed and hid in case the government decided 
to act against them. Therefore, the bulk of the Benedictine properties was constituted by 




rapidly invested the liquidity surplus generated. Thus, in 1892, the treasurer of the 
Monastery was ordered to decide where to invest the surplus generated, preferably in 
safe assets such as State paper and railways.86 The documents analysed reflect, for 
example, the agreements reached in 1913 and 1914 according to which investments 
were made in Riegos del Ebro (25,000 pesetas), public debt at 4 percent (25,000 
pesetas), the “Turkish loan” (5,000 pesetas) and bonds of the railway to San Juan de las 
Abadesas (5,000 pesetas).87 The portfolio’s nominal value in 1933 amounted to 458,775 
pesetas, 39,705 Chilean dollars and 18,300 Italian lire.88 The structure of the portfolio 
showed a balance between fix and variable income. Of the part valued in pesetas, 36.35 
percent (166,800 pesetas) was invested in public debt while the remaining 63.65 percent 
(291,975 pesetas) was destined to purchase company bonds. The Chilean currency was 
almost totally invested in the variable income of companies settled in that country, thus 
balancing the investment in Italian public debt.  
Conclusions. 
First, we would like to highlight the fact that the abbots’ political-strategic 
vision, especially that of Abbot Marcet, was the cornerstone of the success in 
Montserrat. Through the text, we have underlined the swiftness and agility showed by 
the Benedictine Community at Montserrat in adapting the holdership and management 
of its estates and services to the changing Spanish political context. In all occasions, the 
Community acted almost at the same speed as the actual events happened. Abbot Deàs’ 
movements were rapid at the beginning of the 20th century, when he asked Rome for 
permission to transfer the Community’s properties to individual monks. The decisions 
made by Abbot Marcet were as well extremely agile when, in the last 1910s, he set off 
the creation of Larsa. We must again highlight how, less than two months after the 




management of the services annexed to the Monastery and sold the company all the 
personal estate that was susceptible of being confiscated. 
These actions, which could be qualified as defensive, led to the actual 
externalisation of the Community’s activities that were thus assumed by the affiliate 
company. Larsa’s Administration Board undertook the process of improving the 
management of the services, transforming the inherited unprofitable paternalistic system 
into a directorship that reinforced control of the business units. Profit therefore 
increased as well, helping the monks to augment their dividends when they needed 
greater liquidity during the years of the Second Republic. 
Regarding Larsa’s objectives, characteristics and strategies, they present 
similarities with other companies established in Catalonia. Larsa was characterised by a 
strong capitalisation, minimum resort to external capital and profit reinvestment. 
Generally speaking, it was a conservative strategy meant to guarantee the company’s 
survival and to keep control in the hands of the Benedictine monks. The strategy only 
changed during the years of the Second Republic, when Larsa distributed its dividends 
and the immediate interest of the actual proprietors prevailed: to increase liquidity, 
leaving on the background the financial solidity of a company that could be confiscated 
and collectivised any moment. In those years, Larsa’s behaviour differed from that of 
the companies in its environment, which did not seem to be affected by political 
instability. And we must as well consider that Larsa resembled a family firm, a majority 
in the Catalonian businesses sector, in what concerns its objectives, characteristics and 
strategies. 
Finally, the objectives that the monks set for Larsa were totally fulfilled. The 
company achieved that of longevity – it is almost 100 years old by now – and at the 




not accomplish. The reason for this double success lies in that a clever legal division 
between the Community, the company and the properties was established that secured 
the control of the patrimony even during the most critical years of the Second Republic. 
In addition, this division helped improve the economic results of the properties and 
businesses managed by Larsa back then and still nowadays.  
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